Previous research confirms that many employees work in jobs not well matched to their skills and education, resulting in lower pay and job satisfaction. While this literature typically uses cross-sectional data, we examine the evolution of mismatch and its consequences over a career, by using a panel dataset of scientists in the US. The results show that both the incidence of mismatch and its negative consequences appear concentrated among those late in careers. This suggests that past studies of mismatch may exaggerate the degree of inefficiency in labor market matching.
Educational Mismatch and the Careers of Scientists

Introduction
Recent empirical research has shown that a mismatch between the skills that workers have and the skills required in jobs results in adverse economic outcomes.
1 Mismatch has been shown to be negatively correlated with earnings (e.g. Bender and Heywood 2009; Robst 2007a and 2007b; Chevalier 2003; Borghans and de Grip 2000; Groot and Maasen van den Brink 2000) , positively correlated with quits and job change (e.g. Bender and Heywood 2009; Wobers 2003; Allen and van der Velden 2001) , and negatively correlated with job satisfaction (e.g. Baker et al. 2010; Bender and Heywood 2006; Moshavi and Terborg 2003; Belfield and Harris 2002) . Several theoretical conjectures have been offered to explain why these adverse outcomes persist in equilibrium. First, government subsidies of higher education may lead to an oversupply of highly educated workers (Freeman 1976) . Second, persistent informational asymmetries may exist between workers and firms about skill requirements (Tsang and Levin 1985; Malamud 2009 ). Third, institutional characteristics of the labor market, such as internal labor market considerations, can cause earnings to be based on observable characteristics of the worker and job and not directly on productivity (Thurow 1975 ). Yet, these conjectures seem, in part, ex post rationalizations as standard labor market theory would suggest that the disadvantages of mismatch would shrink or vanish as more information became available causing decisions on educational investments and match quality to improve.
The research confirming the adverse consequences of mismatch focuses primarily on cross sectional data. We follow a handful of more recent studies in focusing on panel data.
Moreover, we are particularly interested in using panel techniques to explore the consequences and determinants of mismatch at different parts of a career. There are several compelling reasons for doing this. First, it informs the true consequences of mismatch. Even substantial initial negative consequences of mismatch could be modest in aggregate if they are quickly diminished by improving match quality or if the negative consequences attenuate rapidly. Second, it informs the competing theoretical conjectures by investigating the extent to which any movement toward equilibrium actually exists. Third, it informs our understanding of careers. This is of particular importance in the science-and engineering-based careers we investigate in which human capital requirements change rapidly often in response to frequent technological change. Reinvestment in rapidly depreciating skills becomes neither personally nor socially desirable as the length of the payback periods shrinks. Thus, late career mismatch may be both anticipated and not indicate large scale social inefficiency.
This paper examines these issues using the Survey of Doctoral Recipients (SDR), a micro panel dataset of U.S. workers who have received their PhD in a science or engineering discipline.
We explore the likelihood of mismatch over a career and when in a career its consequences are most negative. We also explore the determinants of mismatch and the factors that cause mismatched workers to become matched. Finally, we explore the pattern in the reasons for mismatch by discipline, by period of career, and by gender. On balance, the evidence suggests that mismatch is more likely late in career, that it is harder to return to a job that matches a worker's education late in career and that the negative consequences of mismatch are greater late in career.
Background
In addition to the cross-section evidence on the negative consequences of mismatch, there is an emerging longitudinal literature to which we contribute. This literature grapples with the persistence and causes of mismatch. Thus, one view is that the mismatched have unmeasured characteristics that may be associated with negative outcomes and that mismatch is an indicator but not a cause of these outcomes. Using Australian longitudinal data, McGuiness and Wooden (2009) identify mismatched workers (over-skilled in their case) as moving rapidly between jobs, lacking in any additional confidence that they will find a better match and, indeed, finding "most remain either in jobs rarely where their skills are not adequately utilized or exit the workforce entirely." (p. 284) In this view, the mismatched may simply be workers of lower ability who never achieve the match their education would imply. This view can be contrasted with the reading of the UK longitudinal data by Lindley and MacIntosh (2008) who suggest that "overeducation is a temporary phenomenon at the start of individuals' careers" and that examination of the transmission mechanisms reveals significant movement out of over-education. Yet, they do identify a minority of individuals for whom over-education is a reasonably permanent state extending over many years.
2
Estimates of the consequences of mismatch also show variation. Verhaest and Omey (2009) show that over-education (as measured by a job analysis approach) has substantially smaller negative consequence on earnings for Flemish school leavers in panel estimates than in cross-section estimates. Nonetheless, the penalty remains statistically significant and there is a hint that the size of the penalty drops with years of work experience. Dolton and Siles (2008) examine the graduates of a single UK university using panel estimates but using an instrumental variable approach to correct for the measurement bias that is typically compounded in such 2 While these studies examine, respectively, over skilling and over education, see Mavromaras et al. (2010) for an attempt to compare Australia and Britain on both the extent of over-skilling and its wage penalty.
estimates. Their ultimate panel estimates of the wage penalty for over-education look very similar in size to those from their cross-section suggesting that low ability may not be the primary source of the wage penalty.
These studies use very different samples and different measures of mismatch. In our sample of PhD holders in engineering and science, we focus on a measure of how closely the job is related to the doctoral degree. Thus, the educational level is held constant but the field of that education varies. The questions on mismatch probe whether or not the current job utilizes and reflects the doctoral education. Examining mismatch among these workers is crucial for several reasons. First, substantial governmental resources are devoted to educating these workers and improving their diversity. Yet, the growth in U.S. university students pursing advanced science degrees has slowed and trained scientists increasingly abandon scientific careers (Preston 2004).
High degrees of mismatch may signal wasted governmental and, hence, societal resources.
Second, managers of the highly skilled remain concerned with maximizing the productivity of their scientific workforce and mismatch has been shown to reduce job satisfaction and, potentially productivity, among research and development workers (Kim and Oh 2002) . Third, the workers we examine play a crucial role in innovation and creating technological progress and their efficient deployment may be particularly critical. In this view mismatch may represent not only a loss in current efficiency but also reduced prospects for future growth.
While documenting the extent of mismatch and its consequences is important, understanding the causes and timing of mismatch is critical and has been understudied. From a market point of view, if initial (early career) mismatch rates are high and persist, this more likely evidences inefficiency in the functioning of the labor market. However, if mismatch emerges late in careers it is unlikely to reflect markets working inefficiently and could indicate just the opposite. In occupations with substantial and frequent changes in skill requirements, the skill sets learned while earning a PhD will depreciate over time. Moreover, reinvesting in the latest skills may not be economically sensible late in a career as the costs exceed the benefits. Thus, individuals may efficiently move from research oriented jobs to management-oriented ones (e.g.
becoming a dean in a university or a manager in government or business). These transitions would be sensible when optimizing over a short remaining expected work life but would still get reported as mismatch. Thus, we posit a substantial theoretical and policy difference between early career mismatch that persists (likely inefficient) and late career mismatch in an era of rapidly changing skill requirements (likely efficient).
More generally, the labor economics literature is clear that many firms employ older workers but will not hire older workers (Hutchens 1986 ). This reflects a potentially efficient use of upward sloping age earnings profiles as a career incentive device to build loyalty and increase worker effort (Lazear 1979 (Lazear , 1981 . A well-recognized consequence of such devices, is that older workers become less likely to find career jobs late in life once displaced from an original career job (Daniel and Heywood 2007; Heywood et al. 2010) . Firms using such devices can afford neither to hire an older worker immediately into the reward phase of such profiles nor to start them over again at the beginning of such profiles (Heywood and Siebert 2009) . Thus, independent of older workers' willingness to invest in recent skills, those mismatched late in life are less able to become properly matched. As these older mismatched workers are being compared to older workers in the reward phase of their earnings profile, the negative consequences of mismatch may be particular severe. Nonetheless, the presence of such older mismatched workers need not be evidence of inefficiency if the alternative is to abandon upward sloping age earnings profiles that generate efficient lifetime effort. Thus, to the extent that deferred compensation represents an important market phenomenon, it would result in older workers being mismatched for longer periods as they cannot easily find alternative career jobs.
Because of this inability to change jobs to find a better match, older workers will face larger relative penalties for mismatch given their position in the upward sloping age earnings profile.
Rapidly depreciating human capital combined with short pay back periods and the potential of efficient upward sloping age earnings profiles allows a series of predictions. First, older workers are more likely to be mismatched as they have less incentive to reinvest in rapidly changing skills. Second, mismatched older workers are less likely to move out of mismatch both because it requires such reinvestment and because firms with deferred compensation contracts would be unwilling to hire them into career jobs. Third, the penalty associated with mismatch will be greater for older workers as they become mismatched and possibly out of career jobs during the reward phase of deferred compensation contracts.
To the extent these predictions are confirmed, mismatch would appear less socially wasteful than might otherwise be the case Put differently, if young workers are less likely to be mismatched and if mismatched, they suffer small penalties and are fairly quickly matched, the concern over mismatches between education and jobs should be minimal. In turn, perhaps, less emphasis should be given to the government role in subsidizing education and the inefficiency of labor market matching and more emphasis should be given to what happens to workers and skills over the course of their careers. 
Data
The data for this analysis comes from the SDR conducted by the National Opinion 1993 , 1995 , 1997 , 1999 , 2001 and 2006 waves. (See Bender and Heywood 2009 http://sestat.nsf.gov for more details of the survey.)
The survey includes a wealth of information including data on socio-demographic, educational, and job characteristics. 4 Central to this study, in each survey, a question is asked that indicates the (self-reported) match between a person's job and his or her education.
Specifically, the question asks: "Thinking about the relationship between your work and your education, to what extent is your work related to your doctoral degree?" The possible responses are "closely related," "somewhat related" and "not related." Those scientists working in jobs not related to their education are presumably using less of the knowledge, training and skills learned in that education. In this critical sense they may be identified as mismatched.
We will first summarize the pattern of which workers are mismatched and then present panel estimates the earnings consequences of mismatch. We will discuss the reasons for mismatch and estimate the determinants of moving into and out of mismatch. We will be sensitive to differences in out patterns by gender and by the three broad types of fields in our sample, hard science (including math), social science and engineering. We recognize that the likelihood of mismatch, the reasons for mismatch and the consequences of mismatch may differ critically among these separate samples and we have sufficient observations, as we will make clear, to provide reasonable estimates within each of these subsamples as well as for the sample as whole. Table 1 gives the rate of mismatch for the different samples in the data. We note the large size of over 200,000 observations across the seven waves. The full sample (pooled over all waves)
Results
Rates of mismatch
shows that more than two-thirds of the respondent observations report that their job is closely related to their education and eight percent indicate that the job and education are not closely related. The yearly pattern hints that mismatch has increased slightly over time. In 1997 the match rate was 69.3 percent, and it falls to 64.5 percent by 2006. It remains unclear whether this decline is due to the aging of the sample or a general increase in mismatch (we return to this issue in our estimation). Males are more likely than females to be somewhat or very mismatched (25.5 percent compared to 22.5 percent and 8.3 percent to 7 percent). Workers with a social science degree are more likely to be matched compared to those with a hard science/math or engineering degree as might be anticipated if more technical skills depreciate more quickly resulting in mismatch later in career. Finally, and unsurprisingly, workers in academia are much more likely to be matched, while nearly 50 percent of workers in the business sector report some degree of mismatch (see Bender and Heywood, 2009 , for more on differences by sector of the economy).
( Table 1 about here.)
In order to explore the role of career, we use several approaches. First, at the bottom of Table 1 , we examine the percentages of mismatch by career stages: 'Early in Career' (10 years or less since degree), 'Middle of Career' (11 to 24 years since degree) and 'Late in Career' (25 or more years since degree). These percentages reveal that those early in their career are more likely to be closely matched (71.3 percent compared to 66.3 and 63.1 percent) and less likely to be severely mismatched (5.9 percent compared to 8.5 and 10.2 percent). In a bit more detail, in indicate that much of the mismatch may be late in a career and may, as a consequence, not be as reflective of labor market inefficiency. We will provide estimations that account for other determinants later when we examine transitions between mismatch statuses. These estimates will support the increase in mismatch late in career.
( Figure 2 about here.)
The earnings consequences of mismatch
Most of the previous literature uses cross sectional data to find a decrease in earnings of 10-20 percent associated with mismatch (see Robst 2007a, for example). This subsection examines whether these findings are robust to using fixed effects estimation. Table 2 reports selected results for the worker fixed effect models estimated for the different subsamples listed in the first column. The first row presents the critical results from the full sample. Workers who are somewhat mismatched suffer a decrease in log wages of 0.024 or slightly more than two percent.
Workers who are very mismatched suffer a decrease in log wage of nearly 0.114 roughly in line with cross-sectional estimates (Robst 2007; Bender and Heywood 2009 ). These fixed effect estimates hold constant the individual specific earnings component and use the variation in match status across individuals to provide the earnings coefficients. Thus, the critical sample size becomes not the number of overall observations but the number of transitions in match status which introduce this variation. As shown in the third column of Table 2 , there exist over 30,000 transitions in mismatch status over the 13 years of the panel. We note that one consequence of the fixed effect estimates is that only time varying parameters add to the estimations summarized in Table 2 .
( for Social Scientists and a relatively small six percent for Engineers.
Broadly then, the results remain in the ballpark of previous studies, even after controlling for fixed effects. The earnings penalties appear to be largest for hard scientists and smallest for engineers. At a minimum, these new results make it unlikely that previous results stemmed largely from sorting in which the inherently less able (those with lower earnings potential) were more likely to be mismatched. The apparent absence of such strong sorting would tend to discount the idea that mismatch happens to a selected sample and be more supportive of the possibility that it is often part of a career cycle. We note that the number of transitions, even within our subsamples, is large enough that it is unlikely that our results flow from a few influential outlying observations. higher chance of a transition helping to boast the number of transitions during that period.
( Table 3 about here.) Along a similar theme, an additional year since degree increases the chance of mismatch.
Reasons for mismatch
Determinants
Moreover, this influence emerges with a stronger marginal effect on mismatch among those late in their career. Those who become disabled late in their career are also more likely to be mismatched, while there is little effect for those early in the career. The results are largely similar when examining movement into the most mismatched category in the final two columns.
We emphasize that as these are conditional logit estimates, the worker dimensions that do not vary by time such as gender, race and the broad field of degree cannot be part of this estimation.
Reasons for severe mismatch
Workers in the survey who report that their job and education are not at all related also identify the most important reason that their job and education are not at all related. The options for response include pay and promotion opportunities, working conditions (hours, equipment, working environment), job location, change in career or professional interests, family-related reasons, job in degree field not available, and an 'other' category. While it is left to the researcher to interpret exactly what might be implied by each response, it is valuable to explore the pattern of responses in light of our hypotheses. We now return to our panel estimates of earnings to incorporate the reasons for mismatch. Recall that the reasons for mismatch are only given for those who identify a severe mismatch. Thus, our fixed effects log earning equations include the one general dummy for being somewhat mismatched and then a series of mutually exclusive dummies indicating the primary reason for severe mismatch where all the coefficients are relative to those who are fully matched. The results are shown in Table 6 which mimics our early results for Table 3 although the subsamples are now shown across the columns. Each subsample is as before and, again, they are divided into early and late in career. Thus, the numbers of transitions generating the aggregate variations in mismatch status are identical to those shown in Table 3 . The current difference is that the single composite measure of severe mismatch is broken down into the causes of that severe mismatch. This implies that the variation for the individual reasons for mismatch is generated by the number of transitions into or out of that cause. Thus, variation can be caused by aggregate variation, a move into severe mismatch and by changes in the cause of mismatch among those reporting mismatch.
( Table 6 about here.)
The full sample results in the first column of 
Mismatch and transitions into and out of mismatch
In this subsection we focus on the transitions between match statuses that have generated our earlier earnings penalties. In starting we emphasize our early point, shown with the mean proportions, that mismatch is more common later in the career. To provide that emphasis we use the available controls and simply estimate the determinants of being mismatched. We take as a dependent variable the dichotomous indicator of being mismatched (either somewhat or severely) and estimate a logit within each of the now familiar samples. In each estimate, the crucial comparison is that across career stage. We compare the influence of the broad middle career and of the late career with the early career influence on being mismatched. The marginal effects of this comparison are shown in column 1 of ( Table 7 about here.)
There exists interesting variation across our subsamples but the broad message does not change. The likelihood of mismatch grows for both men and women with their career stage. The size of that growth is larger for women as they are more likely to be mismatched in late career than are men. The extent of mismatch and growth in mismatch over the career is particularly large for those in hard sciences but the concentration of mismatch in late career is clear for both social scientists and engineers as well.
Having established more concretely our earlier point about the importance of career stage, we now examine the transition of those who are mismatched moving back to a match.
This examination can shed light on the efficiency of the labor market in creating matches. If the probability of moving out of mismatch is low, the inefficiency would be greater all else equal.
Yet, for a given probability of moving out of mismatch, the distribution of that probability remains important. Again, if probabilities are much lower for those late in career we are less concerned about inefficiency and suspect we may be observing the consequences of upward sloping age earnings profiles reflecting deferred compensation.
To examine these transitions we start with workers when we first observe them in mismatch (either somewhat or severe) and we follow them for three subsequent waves (typically six years from initial identification) and observe how many of them become matched. The columns on the left hand side of Social scientists are the most likely to move to matched from mismatched with hard scientists are generally the least likely. 5 The gender differences appear modest.
( Table 8 about here.)
We now estimate the determinants of transitioning from mismatch to match using the available controls and doing so within each of our samples. The dichotomous variable of having made the transition within the three years is the dependent variable in logit estimates. The independent variables include career stage (middle and late relative to early) and the other explanatory variables such as main work activity, years since degree, race, disability status, citizenship status, marital status and region of residence. We take these explanatory variables at the stage of initial observation of a mismatch. The results are shown in the second column of Table 7 and largely support what was shown in the simple proportions. In the full sample, it is the early stage workers who are most likely move from mismatch into match. This sits beside the fact that the early stage began with the fewest mismatched workers. The difference in transition probability between the early stage and the other two stages is particularly large for women and particularly small for engineers.
A second set of transitions provides a fuller picture. We now augment our estimate of the determinants of mismatch with one of determinants of transitions into mismatch. This reverses 5 Attrition into retirement may be influencing the observed patterns. Indeed, separate estimates by the authors show that among those late in career, the mismatched are more likely to retire, even after controlling for demographic characteristics, salary, broad degree field, employment sector, and main job activity (results available from the authors). The fact that the mismatched are more likely to retire biases upward the share of workers who eventually report a match from the selected sample that remain employed. the procedure we just described by starting with workers when we first observe them as matched and following them for three waves to observe how many of them become mismatched. As shown on the right hand side of Table 7 , the full sample mean probability of making a transition to mismatch conditional upon being matched seems to decline modestly with career stage but this is not consistent across the subsamples. It appears to be generated largely by the hard scientists.
We again take the making of a transition as the dependent variables in logit estimation using the available controls and estimating within each of the samples. In the full sample, the pattern evident in the sample statistics vanishes as there is not an evident pattern over career
stage. Yet, this hides offsetting patterns among the broad fields. Hard scientists appear more likely to make the move away from being matched, conditional on being initially matched, in the early stage of their careers. Together with the evidence that this is also the career stage in which hard scientists are more likely to move into a match, conditional on being mismatched, it suggests a lot of churning or change in status early in career for hard scientists. Yet, we emphasize that despite the pattern of the transitions, it remains the case that there are the fewest total mismatches for hard scientists in the early stage. The transition out of being matched shows a different pattern for engineers and social scientists (to a lesser extent). They are less likely to move out of being matched early in career compared to the other career periods.
While we have not been presenting the many full estimates behind the coefficients summarized in Table 7 because presenting all of them would be prohibitively long, they are available from the authors. However, we do include the full sample estimates of the two transitions probabilities in Appendix Table 1 . They reveal the pattern by career stage summarized in Table 8 but are worth briefly discussing to focus on the other controls. Perhaps most important is that engineers are less likely to make the move to being matched compared to social scientists and that hard scientists are even less likely to make the move to being matched compared to social scientists. Similarly, engineers and hard scientists are both much more likely to transition out of being matched. This pattern supports the view that high technology fields with rapidly depreciating skills make moving into mismatch more likely and regaining a match less likely. Women are less likely to find a match once mismatched. They are also more likely to become mismatched once matched. The racial patterns seem less easily explicable with Blacks and Hispanics being more likely to find a match once mismatched and yet Blacks, Asians and Hispanics all being more likely to become mismatched once matched. This pattern suggests more churning among statuses for racial minorities than for Whites.
We note that transitions between statuses may be associated with changes in jobs or employers. While we think these changes are at least as much an effect of growing mismatch as a cause, we included additional indicators in the estimates summarized in the Appendix Table 1 (available from the authors). We use indicators in each wave of whether or not the employee is in the same job and whether or not the employee is with the same employer. Thus, there are four possibilities in each wave, the workers is with the same employer in the same job, with the same employer but in a different job, with a new employer doing the same job or with a new employer doing a different job. In our estimates of the transition probabilities we found a clear pattern but it did not influence the pattern of other results. Changes in mismatch status in either direction are associated with a new job either with the old or with a new employer. Changes in employer but keeping the same job are not associated with an increased chance of status change. This seems sensible as the question that forms the dependent variable directs workers to compare their education with their job and so job changes appear to be associated with changes in mismatch status.
While this picture of differences in mismatch and mismatch transitions over career stages is shaded, several points deserve restatement. First, it is clear from the sample statistics and our estimations that mismatch is most likely late in the career and least likely early in a career.
Second, the ability to transition back into being matched once mismatched is greatest early in the career. Third, the transitioning into mismatch once matched differs by broad flied. For engineers and social scientists, such transitions are least likely in early career while for scientists it is most likely in early career. Thus, while the pattern of churning among hard scientists must be noted,
the overall pattern appears to support our broad hypothesis showing that mismatch is more prevalent late in career and that mismatch early in a career is more likely to be resolved into a match. Finally, we note that hard scientists and engineers are both less likely to transition into a match once mismatched and more likely to transition into mismatch once matched when compared to social scientists.
Conclusions
The literature on both over-education and mismatch is large yet only a few studies have examined their consequences and determinants in a panel framework. Our examination does not measure over-education but does examine the degree of mismatch between education and the current job. It adds value by making use of the panel framework. This framework allows testing whether the results from the cross-sectional estimates are robust and, critically, allows examining what happens to educational mismatch over workers' careers. Again, while mismatch among our sample of PhD scientists may include those who are over-educated, this study has examined a concept that is not vertical (too little or too much education) but is simply about the quality of the match between education and the job. We recognize that our findings are limited by a sample that focuses on those for whom career issues may be paramount. Moreover, the scientific workforce likely faces more rapidly changing human capital requirements and faster depreciation than do typical workers. In addition, the highly educated workers in our sample may be more likely to find themselves in long-term employment relationships that make use of deferred compensation schemes. Thus, it remains an open question whether these findings generalize. Nonetheless, our examination stresses that mismatch may mean fundamentally different things at different points in a career.
Recognizing this emphasizes our point that broad levels of mismatch and greater inefficiency need not always go together. Late career mismatch can be a byproduct of labor markets working appropriately from a full career prospective. Respondents must be in the sample for at least three waves after the mismatch occurs. Other variables controlled for (where applicable) in all subsamples: gender, race, marital status, field of PhD, sector of employment, disability status, marital status, region of residence, citizenship status and main activity. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses under marginal effects are t-statistics. 5  7  9  11  13  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  47 
